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ABSTRACT 
 
MD&A Disclosure Tone and Audit Pricing 
 
Zenghui Liu 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines whether a qualitative component of the common 
information set between auditors and their clients is used in audit pricing decisions. I 
specifically focus on information contents of managers’ disclosure tone within the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) sections of annual reports. I find a 
significant negative association between audit fees and optimistic disclosure tone. 
This finding is consistent with prior research that auditors use client specific 
information in audit pricing decisions. Further analysis shows that in high litigation 
environment the tone fee relation is stronger. This paper contributes to the current 
audit fee literature by documenting the effect of qualitative information, such as the 
disclosure tone, on the pricing decision by auditors.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Prior literature suggests that auditors use quantitative client specific 
information in audit pricing (Hay, Knechel and Wong 2006). This paper extend this 
literature by examining whether a qualitative component of financial reports, MD&A 
disclosure tone, is used in audit pricing decisions. 1 While there is a growing literature 
on disclosure tone, most studies focus on how investors or financial analysts react to 
the tone. Since the qualitative contents provide additional information to the 
quantitative contents (Kothari Li and Short 2009), and it should affect auditors’ 
pricing decisions. To my knowledge, there is little research that has examined whether 
tone information affect auditors' pricing decisions. By filling this gap, this paper 
contributes to audit pricing literature. Additionally, the finding on the effect of 
disclosure tone on audit pricing can help researchers gain understanding on the 
economic consequences of disclosure tone.  
In Simunic’s (1980) analytical model, rational auditors should incorporate any 
information related to engagement risk into their audit pricing decisions. Based on 
this model, empirical audit fee research documents the effects of client firms’ risk 
factors based on quantitative components found in financial reports (Hay et al. 2006; 
Hay 2013). In addition, a few recent studies empirically test and find evidence that 
auditors use firm specific private information in audit pricing (Stanley 2011; Picconi 
                                                            
1 Because MD&A sections are reviewed by auditors, MD&A disclosure tone information is treated as 
part of the common information set shared between auditors and client firm managers in this study. 
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and Reynolds 2013; Hackenbrack, Jenkins and Pevzner 2013; Hribar, Kravet and 
Wilson 2014). While the information shared between managers and auditors could be 
both private and public, such information could also contain both qualitative and 
quantitative components. This paper focuses on examining how qualitative 
information impacts auditors’ pricing decisions. 
The informational content revealed by the disclosure tone should influence 
auditors’ pricing decisions for the following reasons. First, while the quantitative 
financial disclosure provides information on the looking-back performance of the firm, 
the tone of disclosure may provide forward looking information on client business 
risk. Client business risk is the uncertainty that an audit client firm’s economic 
condition will deteriorate in foreseeable future (Stanley 2011). Such risk is a critical 
determinant of whether financial statements contain material misstatements due to 
error or fraud (AICPA 1983), therefore it is also an important factor in auditor pricing 
(O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein 1994). Since the disclosure tone could indicate future 
firm performance (Brayn 1997; Li 2006; Li 2010), an optimistic tone is likely to be 
associated with lower client business risk, which leads to lower audit efforts and 
lower audit fees. Second, prior literature (Pava and Epstein 1993; Clarkson, Kao, and 
Richardson 1999; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Li 2008) suggests that managers tend to 
provide good news rather than bad news in the MD&A sections, and such selectivity 
in disclosure affects the perception of financial analysts and investors (Henry 2008; 
Davis, Piger and Sedor 2008; Demers and Vega 2008). More importantly, Rogers, 
Buskirk and Zechman (2011) provide evidence that an overly optimistic tone 
3 
 
 
 
disclosure increases firm litigation risk. 2 Since auditors may lose reputational capital 
when their clients are sued (Reynolds and Francis 2000), they may charge a higher 
risk premium for overly optimistic disclosing clients to protect themselves. The above 
arguments suggest that the information content of disclosure tone should be important 
to audit pricing decisions, however the direction in which such informational content 
impacts auditors’ pricing decisions is not clear. Therefore, it is an empirical question 
to test how disclosure tone impacts audit pricing decisions. 
To capture management’s disclosure tone, this paper focuses on the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) sections of annual reports. The 
MD&A reflects both what managers believe about the firm’s past events and their 
expectations for the near future (SEC 1983). The forward-looking qualitative 
information contained in the MD&A has an overlap scope with the audit fee contract 
(i.e. the engagement letter) for the fiscal year to be audited.3 Such a feature of MD&A 
sections makes them good subjects to study whether qualitative information has an 
impact on audit pricing decisions. The tone of a MD&A is measured by the frequency 
difference of positive and negative words in the MD&A section using dictionaries 
developed by prior studies (Stone, Dunphy, Smith and Ogilvie 1966; Hart 2000; 
Henry 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2011).  
                                                            
2 There is also empirical evidence that links an optimistic tone to fraud risk. This link will be discussed 
more in the hypothesis part of this study. 
3 The engagement letter is the auditing contract, which documents the auditor’s understanding of the 
terms of an engagement (Auditing standard 311). 
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Focusing on the component of the disclosure tone that is not explained by firm 
performance, I find optimistic scores of disclosure tone are negatively associated with 
audit fees. This finding implies that, on average, auditors view an optimistic tone as a 
signal from managers about their firms’ good future performance (i.e. lower audit 
risk). More importantly, this evidence also supports the argument that qualitative 
information has impacts on auditors’ pricing decisions. This result is robust in a 
number of additional tests. I next explore the factors that may attenuate or strengthen 
the association between the disclosure tone and audit fees. In particular, I examine the 
moderating effects of the litigation environment and earnings informativeness on the 
tone fee relationship.  
The litigation environment could moderate the tone fee relationship because 
such an environment is likely to impact both the disclosure strategies of managers as 
well as auditors’ pricing decisions. Prior literature documents evidence that managers 
will forecast less frequently and disclose more conservatively under litigation pressure 
(Johnson, Kasznik and Nelson 2001; Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Baginski, 
Hasell and Kimbrough 2002; Rogers and Stocken 2005). If managers also disclose 
conservatively in tone, there will be a weaker client risk effect under litigation 
pressure. At the same time, there is evidence that auditors also behave conservatively 
and charge a higher fee to their risky clients in order to protect themselves (Pratt and 
Stice 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997). Specifically, Chen, Krishnan and Pevzner 
(2012) observe that the audit fee premium is higher for firms that disclose optimistic 
non-GAAP earnings post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), in comparison to pre-SOX. If 
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auditors charge a higher fee premium for an optimistic disclosure tone in high 
litigation environment, there will be a strong client risk effect under litigation pressure. 
Overall, the directional change of the tone fee relationship under litigation pressure is 
not clear. I test the tone fee relationship between high litigation industries (following 
Francis, Philbrick and Schipper 1994 definition) and low litigation industries, and pre-
SOX versus post-SOX sample periods. I find that the negative association between 
disclosure tone and audit fees is stronger in the high litigation industries. This result is 
consistent with the mangers’ conservativeness in disclosure when facing litigation 
pressure. No evidence of difference of tone fee relationship between pre-SOX and 
post-SOX period is found. 
For low earnings informativeness firms, future earnings are not well reflected 
from current stock price and earnings. Early analytical research (Barry and Brown 
1986; Merton 1987; Easley and O’hara 2004) posits and later empirical studies 
confirms that mangers use voluntary disclosures to signal information to market 
participants to mitigate information risk, and that such firms benefit through a lower 
cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002;Cheynel 2013). In the same 
vein, Muslu, Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam, and Lim (2014) find that firms tend to 
make more forward looking disclosures in the MD&A when their stock price poorly 
reflects future earnings information. Since the disclosure tone is found to contain 
information about firm’s future earnings and is correlated with future stock 
performance (Bryan 1997; Li 2010), managers could also use the disclosure tone as a 
tool to signal more when the firm has low earnings informativeness. Therefore, I 
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conjecture that the signal effect will be stronger for low earnings informativeness 
subsample. Using the earnings response coefficients as the proxy for earnings 
informativeness, I don’t find supporting evidence for this hypothesis. I will discuss 
this result further in later sections. 
This study contributes to prior literature at least in the following two ways. 
Firstly, a large literature documents that auditors incorporate risk related public 
financial information (Hay et al. 2006; Hay 2013), as well as private information into 
audit pricing decisions (Pratt and Stice 1994; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Stanley 
2011; Picconi and Reynolds 2013; Hackenbrack et al. 2013). By linking disclosure 
tone literature and audit fee determinant literature together, this paper provides first 
evidence on the information content of audit fees literature that qualitative 
information has an impact on the auditors’ pricing decisions.  
Secondly, this study also adds knowledge to ongoing research that explores 
the economic consequences of disclosure tone. Kothari et al. (2009) observe that a 
number of desirable consequences of favorable disclosure tone, such as a decreased 
cost of capital, lower stock return volatility, and higher analyst forecast accuracy. 
Davis et al. (2012) find that the increase in tone optimism is associated with the 
immediate stock price response to earnings announcements. These results support the 
hypothesis that an optimistic disclosure tone is a signal of lower firm risk to the 
investors and financial analysts. This paper extends this literature by providing 
evidence that an optimistic disclosure tone is also an indicator of lower audit risk, 
which is associated with lower audit fees. 
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter 
reviews related prior literature and develops my hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses my 
research design and sample selection, and Chapter 4 presents results. Chapter 5 
concludes this paper. 
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CHAPTER 2: PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
2.1 The Information Content of Audit Fees 
Audit fee negotiations between auditors and the managers of their client firms 
conclude with the engagement letter, which is typically approved by the board 
meeting together with the release of the prior year’s financial results. Once the 
engagement letter is approved and signed by the related parties, audit fees are settled 
for the fiscal year to be audited (Audit Standard 16). The fees can only be changed 
with significant unexpected changes in audit labor, and through a mutual agreement 
between auditors and the management team of their clients (Hackenbrack and Hogan 
2005). The timeline of setting audit fees and annual report filling events is presented 
in Figure 1. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Because of the hard to adjust nature of negotiated fees, auditors usually spend 
significant amount of time and effort collecting and appraising client specific 
information, such as the anticipated future financial performance, discontinued 
operations, litigation risk, business strategies, industry information, and even macro-
economy information during the fee negotiation (Bell, Landsman and Shakelford 
2008; Picconi and Reynolds 2013; Hackenbrack et al. 2013). Therefore, to the largest 
extent possible, auditors will incorporate the engagement risk related both public and 
private client specific information into their audit scope and consequently pricing 
decisions. Part of the client specific information could be qualitative in format, which 
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cannot be measured through financial reporting numbers, for instance, the client 
business competition advantage information. Such information is typically discussed 
in the MD&A sections to present year to year changes in the company’s economic 
situation (Brown and Tucker 2011). This is a possible reason why qualitative 
information has additional contents to numerical financial results for audit pricing 
decisions. 
 Audit fee prediction models typically include audit supply factors, such as, 
client firm audit complexity (client firm size, level of account receivables and 
inventories, foreign operation indictor, number of business segments, audit reporting 
lag length, special items indictor, fiscal year end busy season indictor), client firm 
financial performance (return on assets, loss indictor, quick ratio, current ratio, book 
to market ratio, leverage ratio), and factors that impact audit demand, such as auditor 
characteristics (BigN auditor indictor, auditor tenure length, industry specialist 
indictor). Those audit supply factors are typically derived from financial reporting 
numbers, and are found to be associated with audit fees in the predicted directions 
consistent with the Simunic’s theory (e.g. Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; Crashwell, 
Francis and Taylor 1995; Abbot 2003; Gul, Chen, and Tsui 2003; Antle, Gordon and 
Narayanamoorthy 2006; Chang, Cheng and Reichelt 2010; Defond, Lim and Zang 
2013). See Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) for a complete review and detailed 
discussions of this trend of research. 
In addition to the client risk factors measured by numerical financial reporting 
results, private information is also used in audit pricing decisions. Using proprietary 
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data from large CPA firms, some early research (Pratt and Stice 1994; Johnstone and 
Bedard 2001) show that the audit bid price contains client specific private information 
on both financial reporting errors and fraud risk. A few recent studies also examine 
the private information content of audit fees. Specifically, Stanley (2011) finds an 
inverse relationship between unexplained (or abnormal) audit fees and changes in 
future firm performance. Picconi and Reynolds (2013) find that unexplained audit 
fees are negatively related to stock returns in the small firm sample. Hribar et al. 
(2014) propose to use abnormal audit fees as an accounting quality measure. They 
find that the abnormal fee is useful for predicting restatements, fraud, and Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters. Moreover, Hackenbrack, Jenkins 
and Pevzner (2013) posit that negotiated audit fees contain auditors’ client specific 
knowledge about bad news events that investors will learn eventually, and finds a 
positive association between changes in audit fees and firm stock price crashes. 
Overall, this line of research finds consistent evidence that auditors use client specific 
private information in pricing decisions.  
This study is built on the same theory ground as prior audit fee information 
content studies, however, different from the prior studies by focusing on the impacts 
of qualitative information on audit pricing decisions. Since the auditors need to 
review the MD&A sections during the preparation process (Hufner 2007), the 
disclosure tone is part of the common information set between auditors and their 
clients’ firm managers. Therefore, the information content of the tone is available to 
auditors before the settlement of the auditing contract for the fiscal year to be audited. 
11 
 
 
 
I argue that the tone could be important for auditors’ pricing because of the following 
reasoning. 
2.1.1 Signal Effect of Disclosure Tone 
Early analytical studies suggest that managers may signal to the market about 
firm performance to mitigate the adverse selection problem (Grossman 1981; 
Milgrom 1981). A company manager could use the qualitative property of a textual 
disclosure, such as the disclosure tone, to signal a firm’s future accounting outcomes 
and stock performance to the market participants, in addition to the reported 
numerical financial results. 4  By focusing on 250 MD&A sections, Brayn (1997) 
manually categorizes the disclosure content by the reasons for revenues changes (such 
as, sales price changes, sales volume changes, cost changes, future liquidity, planned 
capital expenditure, etc.), and then codes the above content into favorable, neutral, or 
unfavorable (tone). He finds evidence that the disclosure tone is associated with future 
firm fundamentals (future sales, earning per shares, cash flow) and analysts’ earnings 
forecast revisions. Using a computer program to measure the risk related key words 
frequency as the risk sentiment for over 30,000 annual reports, Li (2006) documents 
that the risk related disclosure tone of 10-K forms is correlated significantly with 
lower future earnings and more negative future stock returns. Furthermore, using the 
machine learning technique and the Naïve Bayesian algorithm, and by focusing on the 
forward looking statements in the MD&A sections, Li (2010) classifies the tone of 
                                                            
4 Here, I only summarize the articles that examine the tone information content of the verbal part of 
corporate filings (10Qs and 10Ks). Please see Kearney and Liu (2014) for a complete review of 
disclosure tone literature. 
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such statements into positive, neutral, negative, and uncertain categories and finds that 
the tone is associated with future firm earnings, liquidity, and also has incremental 
explanatory power to other common proxies in predicting future stock returns. Finally, 
Bochkay and Levine (2014) find that a combination of the MD&A sentiment and 
quantitative numbers together (i.e. text enhanced models) leads to a better estimation 
of firms’ future performance than models only using quantitative variables. Taken 
together, evidence from prior literature suggests that the disclosure tone has 
incremental information content about a company’s future financial outcomes and 
stock performance, which has a large overlap with the client business risk accessed by 
external auditors.  
Johnstone (2000) argues that client business risk, or the risk that an audit 
client’s economic condition will deteriorate in the future, is one of the primary risks 
accessed by auditors.5 An extensive audit literature (Pratt and Stice 1994; Morgan and 
Stocken 1998; Bell, Landsman and Shakelford 2001; Lyon and Maher 2005; 
Venkataraman, Weber and Willenborg 2008; Stanley 2011) documents that client 
business risk could impact audit effort, and therefore audit fees in the following two 
ways. Firstly, a client firm with high client business risk is likely to lack the necessary 
resources and internal controls to prepare reliable financial reports, and faces large 
pressure to commit fraud to hide declining performance (AICPA 1983, 1997). 
Secondly, the “deep pockets” of auditors could motivate investors to bring law suits 
                                                            
5 Client business risk include, but not limited to the firm performance. Bell, Doogar and Solomon 
(2008) documents that auditors access clients’ industry, strategy, business models and other qualitative 
information to evaluate client business risk. 
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against auditors to recover their losses, regardless of whether material misstatements 
exist in the financial statement or not (Wallace 1985). Overall, the risk of 
misstatement and litigation risk exposure will motivate auditors to provide more 
thorough and costly audit procedures to achieve an acceptable level of audit risk, or to 
charge a fee premium to high client business risk clients to protect themselves.  
Using different client business risk proxies (return on assets, loss, liquidity 
ratio, stock returns), prior literature (Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and 
Raghunandan 2003; Francis and Wang 2005; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009; Stanley 
2011) finds consistent evidence of a positive association between audit fees and the 
different dimensions of the client business risk of client firms. If an optimistic 
disclosure tone is a signal of lower client business risk in addition to reported 
financial results, then such a disclosure tone should be negatively associated with 
audit fees. I refer to this argument as the “signal effect” of disclosure tone. 
 
2.1.2 Client Risk Effect of Disclosure Tone 
In addition to the signal effect, prior literature also finds evidence that overly 
optimistic disclosures are related with risk of earnings management (i.e. fraud risk) 
and litigation risk. Jaggi and Sannella (1995) examine the relationship between the 
earnings forecasts errors and accounting changes under managers’ discretion.6 They 
find an association between the adoption of discretionary accounting changes and a 
                                                            
6  Fraud is typically considered as very aggressive earnings management activities in accounting 
literature. In this paper, I use fraud risk and earnings management risk interchangeably.  
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higher accuracy of management earnings forecasts, and that such relationship is 
stronger for the negative pre-change forecast errors. This evidence is consistent with 
the theory that managers adopt discretionary accounting changes to match their prior 
overly optimistic earnings forecasts. Similarly, Kasznik (1999) examines whether 
firm managers who issue annual earnings forecasts manipulate reported financial 
results towards their forecast using the tool of discretionary accruals. After controlling 
for possible existing endogeneity, he finds that managers use income-increasing 
discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings results upward when reported numbers 
would otherwise drop below managers’ prior forecasts. However, he doesn’t find 
evidence of the mangers who have underestimated earnings to manage reported 
earnings downward.  
Auditors are obligated to assess fraud risk, and exert additional time and effort 
to address the risk of fraud (O’Reilly, McDonnel, Winograd, Gerson and Jaenicke. 
1998). Specifically, Statement of Auditing Standard 99 lists “overly optimistic press 
releases or annual report messages” as an indicator of fraud risk. The Pricewaterhouse 
audit manual mentions the following instructions for assessing fraud risk: “Undue 
emphasis placed on achieving earnings per share forecasts or on maintaining market 
value of capital stock, including overly optimistic news releases or communications to 
shareholders”. Furthermore, Manry, Mock and Turner (2007) provide empirical 
evidence that incentive for managers to meet their overly optimistic forecasts will 
increase the fraud risk accessed by their external auditors, impact auditing effort, and 
result in more auditing fees charged by external auditors. In summary, prior literature 
15 
 
 
 
finds evidence that managers tend to manipulate earnings to meet their past overly 
optimistic quantitative earnings forecasts, and that such behavior could motivate their 
auditors to extend their effort to assess their client fraud risks, and charge more fees to 
such clients. Extending the above theory and evidence to the qualitative property of 
disclosure, such as an overly optimistic disclosure tone, I conjecture that if such a tone 
is useful for assessing a manager’s earnings management risk, then it should be 
positively associated with audit fees. 
In addition to providing more audit effort to reduce the fraud risk of their 
clients, auditors may also face direct economic losses or indirect reputational losses 
from shareholder litigations that originated from overly optimistic disclosures.7 Under 
SEC rule 10b-5, shareholders can sue a company if they suffer from losses related 
with this company’s misleading disclosure. Typical disclosure-related litigation 
plaintiffs allege that their expectation regarding the defendant firm future performance 
are too high because the managers distribute overly optimistic information or 
inadequately distribute pessimistic information (Rogers et al. 2011). Skinner (1994) 
argues that managers have implicit responsibility to inform the market participants 
timely with their knowledge of the firms’ future performance. A company fails to do 
so will face the risk of investor litigation targeting on the misleading stock price. In 
other words, an overly optimistic disclosure may trigger a litigation event because 
there is usually a significant price drop when the market realizes that the firm 
                                                            
7 Higher fraud risk leads to higher litigation risk, here I separate litigation risk from fraud risk because 
it is possible that an optimistic discourse tone may trigger a litigation event without the presence of 
fraud risk. 
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performance is below the expectation, and shareholders could initiate lawsuits to 
recover their losses from such price drops. Consistent with Skinner’s (1994) findings, 
some shareholder lawsuits cited either optimistically biased management forecasts 
(quantitatively biased) or overly optimistic disclosure tone (qualitatively biased) as 
key factors that caused a misleading stock price.8 More directly, Francis, Philbrick 
and Schipper (1994) examine whether the assessment of disclosure tone is related 
with the probability of getting sued in a sample from the period before the enactment 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 [PSLRA]. However, they find 
no relationship between tone and litigation. By focusing on a small post-PSLRA 
sample span from 2001 to 2008, Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) find that 
complainants targeted more optimistic reports in their lawsuits and that the earnings 
announcements of sued firms’ are unusually optimistic relative to other firms in 
similar economic situations. This result suggests that an overly optimistic tone is 
associated with increased litigation risk.  Moreover, Krishnan, Pevzne and Sengupta 
(2012) document an audit fee premium for optimistic earnings forecast firms. Chen et 
al. (2012) find that optimistic non-GAAP earnings (pro forma earnings) disclosure is 
also associated with higher audit fees. These results imply that an auditor’s views of 
an overly optimistic disclosure tone as an additional litigation risk factor after 
controlling for reported financial results. In summary, this evidence suggests that the 
quantitative disclosure bias is correlated with a higher litigation risk, therefore 
                                                            
8  Example firms with optimistic (quantitatively) biased disclosures that were sued include: Krisp 
Kreme (AAER 2941), Waters Corporation, Horizon Lines, PharmaNet (Krishnan et al. 2013); Example 
firms with overly optimistic tone disclosures that were sued include: VoiceFlash Networks; Metris 
Companies (Rogers et al. 2011); 
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resulting in higher audit fees. Since prior literature has found that disclosure tone 
(qualitative bias) is also associated with litigation risk, I conjecture that an overly 
optimistic disclosure tone is also associated with higher audit fees. Hereafter, I refer 
to this effect as the “client risk effect” of disclosure tone.  
Although there are some guidelines from the SEC about the MD&A section of 
annual reports (SEC 1983; 1987; 1989), the tone is set by management and the 
MD&A section is only reviewed by auditors, and not audited. Managers have a broad 
liberty to decide what to say (content) and how to say it (tone). Depending on the 
degree of usage under the agency incentives, the disclosure tone could be used by 
managers to further inform investors about firm fundamentals (signal effect), or to 
obscure firm fundamentals, resulting in increased litigation risk (client risk effect). 
The above discussion of the signal effect versus the client risk effect suggests that ex 
ante the impact of an optimistic disclosure tone on the pricing decisions of auditors is 
not clear. Therefore, my first hypothesis makes the following competing predictions 
about the tone fee relationship:  
H1a: If the signal effect dominates, then audit fees are negatively associated with the 
disclosure tone. 
H1b: If the client risk effect dominates, then audit fees are positively associated with 
the disclosure tone. 
 
2.2 Litigation Environment and the Tone Fee Relationship 
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Prior literature has found evidence that managers are conservative in the 
content of disclosures when they are facing litigation risks. The Jenkins Committee 
Report (1994) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
claims that “fear of litigation” is a major hindrance in providing forward-looking 
information in disclosure. Consistently, Baginski, Hasell and Kimbrough (2002) find 
that Canadian companies are likely to forecast more frequently, more precisely, and 
with longer forecast scope comparing to the matched US companies due to high 
litigation pressure in the United States. Moreover, Johnson, Kasznik and Nelson 
(2001) find managers tend to issue earnings forecast more frequently post-PSLRA. 
This result is in line with the theory that PSLRA reduces litigation pressure in general, 
which motivates managers to disclose more predictive information. In another similar 
study, Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) document that managers forecast more 
frequently post-PSLRA when firms offer CEO stock options. More importantly, using 
a probit model to estimate the likelihood of litigation, Rogers and Stocken (2005) 
regress management earnings forecast errors on a number of determinants, including 
litigation environment, industry concentration, firm financial performance and insider 
trading activities. They find evidence that the managers issue less optimistic or more 
pessimistic forecasts under litigation pressure. In summary, the evidence from the 
prior literature suggests that firms with litigation pressure tend to forecast less, and 
forecast more conservatively in content. If the managers are more conservative in 
disclosure tone when facing litigation pressure, there should be a weaker client risk 
effect (or stronger signal effect) for firms in a high litigation environment. 
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Prior literature (Pratt and Stice 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997) document 
that auditors are sensitive to the litigation environment and also behave more 
conservatively under litigation pressure. Specifically, auditors tend to charge more 
fees, issue more going-concern opinions, and eventually may even resign from risky 
clients to protect themselves. By focusing on a size and industry matched sample, 
Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn (2002) posit and finds that UK auditors charge a fee 
premium for UK firms cross-listed on US stock markets. In another study, 
Venkataraman, Weber and Willenborg (2008) observe that auditors charge a 
significant fee premium for pre-IPO engagements compared to post-IPO engagements. 
Moreover, Badertscher, Jorgesen, Katz and Kinney (2014) find that auditors charge a 
near 20% fee premium for the public firms as compared to private firms after 
controlling for size and other fee determinants. In summary, the audit fee premium for 
US cross listed UK firms, pre-IPO firms, and public firms is in line with the theory 
that auditors are sensitive to litigation risk change, and react by charging more fees to 
protect themselves. These evidence suggests a stronger client risk effect in a high 
litigation environment. 
Overall, taking the managers’ and auditors’ behavior together, it is not clear 
how the tone fee relationship change with the litigation environment. Therefore, I 
state my second hypothesis as the following: 
H2: The tone fee relationship is not moderated by high litigation environment. 
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2.3 Information Environment and the Tone Fee Relationship 
Because the business operating cycle is continuous, current earnings and stock 
price certainly have information content about future earnings (Ball and Brown 1968). 
For the low earnings informativeness firms, mangers have superior information 
regarding the firm’s future performance compared to external investors. Because of 
such information asymmetry, future earnings are not well reflected by the current 
stock price (or returns). Prior literature (Barry and Brown 1986; Merton 1987; 
Cheynel 2013) analytically studied the consequences of such information asymmetry, 
and found that investors will demand a premium for bearing such information risk, 
and that managers could lower the cost of external financing caused by this problem 
through the voluntary disclosure of related information (Signaling). These analytical 
implications are well supported by empirical results (Botosan 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Easley and O’hara 2004;). More importantly, Muslu et al. (2014) find 
firms make more forward looking disclosures in the MD&A when their stock price 
poorly reflects future earnings information. These results support the hypothesis that 
managers use more forward-looking content in MD&A sections to mitigate the 
information risk when the earnings informativeness is low. As discussed earlier, the 
disclosure tone is informative about firms’ future earnings, and is correlated with 
firms’ future stock performance and analysts’ earnings forecast revisions (Bryan 1997; 
Li 2008). Therefore, I conjecture that managers could also use disclosure tone as a 
tool to mitigate the information asymmetry problem when the earnings 
informativeness is low. Therefore, my next hypothesis predicts: 
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H3a: If the signal effect dominates, then the audit fees are more negatively associated 
with the disclosure tone in low earnings informativeness firms. 
H3b: If the client risk effect dominates, then the audit fees are less positively 
associated with the disclosure tone in low earnings informativeness firms. 
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
 
 
 
The empirical design to examine whether auditors use qualitative information, 
such as the disclosure tone, in their pricing decisions includes the following steps: (1) 
select disclosure materials (or channels) to study the disclosure tone; (2) quantify the 
disclosure tone with positive and negative dictionaries from prior literature; (3) merge 
the tone data with the COMPUSTATA database for firm financial information, the 
Audit Analytics database for audit fees, auditor tenure, and audit industry specialist 
information, the I/B/E/S database for analyst earnings forecasts information, and the 
CRSP database for stock price information; and (4) run regression models with audit 
fees as the independent variable, the disclosure tone scores as the experiment variable, 
and reported numerical financial results and other necessary audit fee determinants as 
the control variables. 
 
3.1 Identifying the Subjects to Study the Disclosure Tone 
By focusing on the MD&A sections of annual financial reports, this study 
examines whether qualitative disclosure tone information has an impact on the pricing 
decisions of external auditors. In addition to SEC filings, a company could use a 
verity of channels to communicate with public investors, such as earnings press 
releases, conference calls, and so forth. Different from other modes of communication, 
the MD&A sections of the annual reports are required by the SEC to provide forward-
looking information on known trends, demands, events, commitments, plans and 
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uncertainties that are reasonable likely to materially affect liquidity, capital resources 
or operations (SEC 1989, SEC 2003). As discussed in previous sections, such 
qualitative information could be used by auditors to understand more about their 
client business risk and litigation risk, and therefore impact the audit scope design and 
audit fees of the following fiscal year.9 Appendix I provides examples of forward-
looking statements excerpted from Intel Corporation’s annual report for the fiscal year 
that ended on 12/31/2012. Muslu et al. (2014) document that there is considerate 
variation of forward-looking contents intensity across companies and industries. 10,11 
Furthermore, audit fees are determined around annual report filing events. The 
audit fee contract (i.e. the engagement letter) is typically approved in the same board 
meeting that approves the release of the financial results of previous year 
(Hackenbrack et al. 2013). The reason why I did not analyze the MD&A sections 
from quarterly financial reports (10-Qs) is because, the information there could be so 
old that auditors already adjusted their effort accordingly before the negotiation of 
next year audit fee contract starts.  
                                                            
9 Another possible reason why such qualitative information is valuable (to auditors): the quantitative 
voluntary forecast is not as popular as qualitative forward-looking statements. Krishnan et al (2012) 
documents that more than 60% of publicly traded US firm didn’t voluntary forecast in the period 
between 2001 and 2006. Anilowski and Skinner (2007) finds similar results. Both studies use the first 
call (CIG) database, which focuses on quantitative forecasts. 
10 Forward-looking statements have an overlap scope with the audit fee contract (i.e. engagement letter). 
However, statements that are related with current year discontinued operations could also be 
informative to auditors for designing the upcoming fiscal year’s audit scope. Therefore, this paper uses 
overall disclosure tone scores as an experimental variables.  
11 Muslu et al. (2014) document the forward-looking intensity, defined by the number of forward-
looking sentences divided by the total number of sentences for a MD&A section, varies from 0% to 
72%, and has mean (median) close to 13%. 
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3.2 Quantifying the Disclosure Tone 
Following previous literature (Henry and Leone 2010; Rogers et al. 2011; 
Huang et al. 2014), I perform content analysis to quantify tone of MD&A sections 
with four specific positive and negative words dictionaries explained below. 
Specifically, I use Perl programs to match and count the positive and negative words 
found in each MD&A section. The tone score is measured as the count of positive 
words minus the count of negative words, scaled by the total words of that particular 
MD&A section (hereafter referred to as raw tone score).12 Based on this definition, a 
larger value for such score corresponds to a more optimistic disclosure tone.  
The four dictionaries used in this study to measure tone scores are as the 
following. The first one is the Harvard General Inquiry Index (GI hereafter), 
published by Harvard social psychologist Philip J. Stone. The second word list was 
obtained from a content analysis software package (Diction; DI hereafter), developed 
by University of Texas at Austin politics and mass media linguist Roderick P. Hart. In 
addition to these two general context analysis dictionaries, I also use financial 
reporting context-specific dictionaries developed by Elaine Henry (Henry 2006, 2008; 
EH hereafter), and Tim Loughran and Bill McDonald (Loughran and McDonald 2011; 
                                                            
12 My results are similar if I use the positive words count plus the negative words count as the deflator. 
Tone scores are measured with the assumption of an equal weight on each word, regardless if it is 
identified as positive or negative. Henry and Leone (2010) studied the alternative word-frequency-
inverse document frequency weighting (wf-idf) method, and their conclusion is that this commonly 
used method for information retrieval algorithms (e.g. Google) cannot be logically transferred to the 
measurement of tone in the context of financial disclosure. In addition, most prior studies, such as 
Davis et al. (2008), Demers and Vega (2008) and Kothari et al. (2009) all employ equal weighting 
method to measure the disclosure tone. 
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LM hereafter). Although Henry and Leone (2010) argue that the EH and LM 
dictionaries are more powerful than the GI and DI dictionaries in measuring 
qualitative information in the context of financial disclosure, Roger et al (2011) argue 
that the general context dictionaries have an advantage in capturing meaningful 
semantic variation in financial disclosures. Since it is not clear which dictionary is the 
best to address my research question, I measured the disclosure tone with all of them, 
and the results were found to be consistent across the four different tone 
measurements. To catch the maximum variations between the different tone measures, 
I use principal component analysis to construct a single factor (TONE) from the tone 
measurements based on different dictionaries.13 
To decompose the tone into the part that is subject to a manager’s discretion 
and the part that commensurate with a firm’s performance, I run industry year 
regressions with the principal component factor (TONE) as dependent variable, and 
the tone determinants identified by prior research as independent variables (Li 2010, 
Huang et al. 2014). The residual parts of the regressions are defined as the abnormal 
part of the tone (hereafter referred to as ABTONE), and the predicted parts of these 
regressions are defined as the normal tone (hereafter referred to as NTONE). The 
detailed steps and variables used for decomposing are reported in Appendix II. 
  
3.3 Preparing the Sample 
                                                            
13 See Appendix A of Rogers et al. (2011) for a full comparison of four different wordlists used in this 
work. 
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For this study, I obtained the annual report header information of companies 
from EDGAR filings with a Perl program, the MD&A sections of annual reports 
downloaded from Noah Smith’s website (i.e. Noah’s ARK) at Carnegie Mellon 
University, historical financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock return information 
from CRSP, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, and audit related data from Audit 
Analytics. The MD&A data and audit fee data limit my sample period to 2000-2006. 
14,15 I use a Perl Program to count the positive and negative words of each MD&A 
section, then I merge the tone data with the corresponding annual report header 
information (extracted from firm annual reports with a Perl program) to form my raw 
tone data.16 After that, I merge the raw tone data with firm financial information data 
from COMPUTSTAT, historical stock price data from CRSP, financial analyst’ 
earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S, and audit related data from Audit Analytics. 
Observations are eliminated from the sample if there are missing control variables in 
the decomposing tone model, or missing control variables in the audit fees model, or 
if the observations are from regulated industries, which are identified by the first 2 
digits of the standard industry classification (SIC) code between 40 and 49, or if the 
observations are from financial industries (first 2 digits of the SIC code between 60 
and 69).  
                                                            
14 The SAS tutorial examples on the WRDs.us website, developed by Johannes A Impink, are very 
helpful for downloading EDGAR filings and data management. 
15 The audit fees data start from 2000, which constrains me from studying tone-fees effects earlier than 
year 2000. 
16 This work also benefits from the Perl programs on Andrew Lenone’s Website: Inkwellanalytics.com. 
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To mitigate the effect of potential outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the one percent and 99 percent levels before analysis. The final sample 
size is 6,708 firm-year observations from 2,146 firms. The sample selection procedure 
is reported in Table 2 Panel A. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 The year and industry distribution of my sample is shown in Table 2 Panel B. 
Industries are classified by Fama-French 12 industry portfolios.17 There is no industry 
and year clustering in the sample. 
 
3.4 Regression Model 
To test the association between my proxies for disclosure tone and the fees 
paid to auditors, I run the following regression model based on audit fee models from 
prior literature (Hay et al. 2006): 
LAUDITt = α0 + β0DISCLOSURE_TONEt-1 + β1LOGATt + β2BMt + β3BUSYt+ β4ROAt 
 + β5QUICKt + β6LEVERAGEt + β7LOSSt + β8INVRECt 
 + β9SPITEMt + β10NSEGt+ β11FOPSt+ β12BIGNt 
+ β13GCMt + β14REPORT_LAGt+ β15TENUREt+β16EXPERTt 
+ ∑INDUSTRIES +∑YEARS +εjt. 
                                                            
17 The Fama-French industry portfolios definitions were obtained from their website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
Note that financial and regulated industries are deleted from the sample, and durable and non-durable 
consumer goods are combined for illustration purposes in Table 2, Panel B. 
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The dependent variable (LAUDIT) is the natural log of fees (in 000s) paid to 
auditors for audit services.18 DISCLOSURE_TONE is my disclosure tone metric, the 
primary experimental variable, including the prior year’s TONE_EH, TONE_LM, 
TONE_GI, TONE_DI, TONE, and ABTONE, is calculated as described in section 
3.2.19 I expect a negative (positive) association between the prior year tone metric and 
current year audit fees if the signal (client risk) effect dominates the client risk (signal) 
effect”.  
Based on prior research, my audit fees model include the following common 
independent variable to control for audit effort. The natural log of total assets 
(LOGAT) measures for client firm size (Simunic 1980). The number of consolidated 
segments of the client firm (NSEG), the audit reporting lag in days, (REPORT_LAG), 
and an indicator variable of whether the company has foreign operation (FOPS) 
controls for the audit complexity (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). The proportion of total 
assets in inventory and accounts receivable (INV_REC) proxies the magnitude of high 
audit risk items (Hogan and Wilkins 2008). SPITEM is an indicator variable 
measuring whether the client firms report special items (Palmrose 1986). Auditee firm 
financial health are proxied by the return on assets (ROA), the indicator of the 
reporting negative earnings (LOSS), the debt level (LEVERAGE), the going concern 
                                                            
18 To be consistent with Abbot (2003), Field et al. (2004), Mayhew and Wilikins (2003), and other 
previous studies, the natural log of audit fees in thousands of dollars is used as independent variables in 
this study. 
19 Following Defond and Zhang (2013), the experimental variables are the prior year’s disclosure tone. 
Furthermore, the prior year’s annual reporting filling and audit fee contract (engagement letter) are 
close in time. 
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opinion indicator (GCM), and the book to market ratio (BM) (Francis et al. 2005). 
Lastly, I include both national and city level auditor expertise (EXPERT), the number 
of years any auditor has served her specific client (TENURE), and an indicator 
variable of whether the auditor is one of the bigN auditors (BIGN) to control for 
auditor characteristics (Balsam et al. 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010). Lastly, I 
include 13 industry and year dummies variables to control for industry and year fix 
effects (INDUSTRIES, YEARS) (Ashbaugh et al. 2003).20 A detailed description of 
variable definitions is listed in Table 1.21  
<Insert Table 1 here>  
Two proxies of high litigation environment are used for this study. Following 
Francis et al. (1994) and Ajinkya et al. (2005), I set up a dummy variable 
(LITIGATION), which equals 1 for the high litigation industries subsample, and 
equals 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable (SOX), which is set to equal 1 for the 
post-SOX sample period, and equal 0 otherwise (Chen et al. 2012). The proxy of low 
earnings informativeness (LOW_INFO), equals 1 if the firm has low earnings 
response coefficient (ERC) than the sample median ERC, and equals 0 otherwise. The 
calculation details of ERC on the firm level is reported in Appendix III. To study the 
moderating effect of litigation environment (and earnings informativeness) on tone 
fee relationship, the interaction terms of the disclosure tone and the indicator variable 
                                                            
20 Using alternative industry dummy variables defined by the fama-french 12 or 48 industry portfolios, 
or 2 digits SIC code, yield similar results as reported.  
21 Industry audit expert or Industry specialist auditor is defined on both the national and city (or the 
metropolitan statistical areas) levels following Reichelt and Wang (2010). Similar results are found if 
we use national or city level audit expert as a control variable in my regression model. 
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of high litigation environment (or low earnings informativeness) is added to our main 
regression. If the high litigation environment (or low earnings informativeness) is 
associated with a weaker client risk effect (or stronger signal effect), then I expect the 
coefficient on the interaction term of high litigation indictor and disclosure tone to be 
negative significant in the audit fee regressions, and vice versa.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive and Univariate Results 
Table 3 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The mean of the 
raw tone scores (TONE_EH, TONE_GI, TONE_DI), the principle component of the 
four different dictionaries (TONE) and the normal tone (NTONE), are all positive. 
This is in line with the fact that usually the MD&A tone is optimistic. One exception 
is the mean of the raw tone score TONE_LM being negative. This is likely due to the 
LM dictionary having a much larger negative wordlist than its positive wordlist.22 The 
mean of the abnormal tone (ABTONE) is zero by construction.  The mean and median 
of all tone scores are quite close, suggesting that these variables are symmetrically 
distributed. 
The mean audit fee is one million two hundred and seventy thousand dollars, 
which is a lot larger than the median audit fee of six hundred and fifteen thousand 
dollars. After the logarithm transformation, the mean and median of the audit fees 
(LAUDIT) are quite close. The natural logarithm transformation also helps reduce the 
difference between mean and median of the total assets. The mean ROA is -0.05, 
which suggest that many firms in my sample experienced poor performance during 
the sample years. Ninety-three percent of the sample firm years were audited by one 
of the big N auditors. This corresponds to the fact that large auditors dominate the 
                                                            
22 The negative mean of TONE_LM is consistent with Loughran and McDonald (2011)’s mean score 
being negative for the annual reports sample. 
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American auditing market. Twenty-eight percent of sample firm years were audited 
by both national and city level industry specialists (EXPERT =1). On average the 
REPORT_LAG is 106 days. This is because my sample includes a lot of non-
accelerated filing firms.23 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Table 3, Panel B displays the correlation matrix for the variables in the 
regressions. In line with previous studies, the natural logarithm of total assets 
(LAUDIT) is positively correlated with the client size proxy (LOG_AT). The tone 
measurements are not correlated with LAUDIT in a consistent direction. Therefore I 
am not able to draw any preliminary inferences based on the correlations between the 
disclosure tone scores and audit fee variable. As expected, the principle component 
(TONE) of all the raw tone scores, the normal part of the tone (NTONE), and the 
abnormal part of the tone (ABTONE) are all highly correlated with the raw tone scores 
(TONE_EH, TONE_GI, TONE_DI, TONE_LM). However, NTONE and ABTONE are 
not correlated with each other because of the decomposing setup, i.e. the residual is 
orthogonal with independent variables. It is also worth noting that NTONE is 
correlated with a lot of variables, while the ABTONE is only very weakly correlated 
with some variables. This evidence suggests that the decomposing tone processes 
were successful in capturing the discretionary part of the tone in the ABTONE 
variable. The high correlation between ABTONE and TONE is likely due to the low 
                                                            
23 The total asset mean (1,469 Million Dollars) is a lot larger than the total asset median (368 Million 
Dollars). 
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explaining power of tone determination models. Since the correlation coefficients are 
quite small between independent variables, the VIF scores from all regressions in this 
paper are less than four. Therefore, multicolinearity is unlikely to be an issue in this 
study. 
I next split the sample by the median (0.00) of the discretional MD&A 
disclosure tone (ABTONE), and I conduct univariate tests comparing the means and 
medians of the descriptive statistics of the subsamples. The results from my univariate 
analyses suggest that firms with a more optimistic abnormal disclosure tone have 
lower audit fees, smaller book to market ratios, smaller quick ratios, less special items, 
less foreign operations, higher leverage ratios, and are audited more often by industry 
specialists. It is in line with hypothesis H1a (the signal effect dominates client risk 
effect) that optimistic disclosure firms have lower audit fees. I utilize multivariate 
regressions to further study the tone fee relationship in next section. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Regression Results  
I first analyze the tone fee relationship with the raw tone scores (TONE_EH, 
TONE_GI, TONE_DI, TONE_LM), and the principle component tone factor (TONE) 
as experimental variables in audit fee regression models. The results are summarized 
in Table 4. The regressions have a high-adjusted R-square value (0.81), which 
reconfirms the high explanatory power of audit fee models as reported in prior 
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literature.24 All of the coefficients of the control variables are in the expected direction 
as the prior literature (Hay et al. 2006; Hay 2013). Year and industries dummy 
variables are included in the regressions however not reported, and standard errors are 
clustered on the firm level.25  
In line with the fact that different wordlists capture different variations for the 
disclosure tone, the coefficients on the raw tone scores vary from model 1 to model 5. 
Particularly, TONE_DI seems weaker than the other three dictionaries in my research 
setting.26 Despite the difference in magnitude, the coefficients of the raw tone scores 
and the principle component tone factor (TONE) are all negative significant (p=0.02 
for TONE_DI, and p<0.00 for other tone scores). If the overall disclosure tone is 
considered as discretional, then the negative associations between favorable 
disclosure tone scores and audit fees as reported in Table 4 suggest that the signal 
effect dominates the client risk effect in the sample. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Huang et al. (2014) argues that the disclosure tone has two components: one 
part is the tone determined by firm performance or economic fundamental (normal 
tone, or NTONE), the other part is the tone that reflects the discretion of managers in 
disclosure (abnormal tone, or ABTONE). Following this work, I decompose the 
                                                            
24 Audit fee models are well specified and usually have high-adjusted R-Square values. For example, 
Chang et al (2010) has adjusted R-Square 0.79 in their fee regressions. Krishnan et al. (2011) has 
adjusted R-square 0.79 and 0.81 in their fee regressions. 
25 The results stay similar if standard errors are clustered on the firm level (Krishnan et al. 2013), or are 
clustered on both firm and year levels (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). 
26 Whether or not it include Tone_DI in the principle analysis, the results do not change. 
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overall tone (TONE) into the normal tone (NTONE) and the abnormal tone (ABTONE) 
(see Appendix II for detailed procedures for decomposing). I next examine the tone 
fee relationship for the abnormal tone (ABTONE) with (or without) the normal tone 
(NTONE) as a control variable. The results are reported in Table 5. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Since the normal tone (NTONE) refers to the part of tone that commensurates 
with firm current and future performance, it is not surprising to find the coefficient 
normal tone (NTONE) are negative and significant (p<0.00) as reported in model 1 
and model 3 of Table 5, which indicate a strong signal effect associated with the 
normal tone. I also find that the coefficient of the abnormal tone (ABTONE) are 
negative and significant (p<0.00) in audit fee determination regression results as 
reported model 2 and model 3 of Table 5.  This evidence further confirms that the 
signal effect dominates the client risk effect in my sample. Therefore, hypothesis H1a, 
the signal effect is dominating, is supported (and hypothesis H1b, the client risk effect 
is dominating, is not supported) by the results presented in Table 5. At the same time, 
the negative association between tone and fees also implies that auditors view an 
optimistic disclosure tone as a signal of good future performance and of lower audit 
risk, and charge lower fees to firms disclosing with a favorable tone. A one standard 
deviation change of ABTONE increase is associated with about $50,000 saving in 
audit fees. More importantly, this evidence also suggests that qualitative information 
is impounded into audit fees. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence 
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about whether auditors use qualitative disclosure information in the audit pricing 
decisions. 
Next, I test whether the litigation environment could moderate the tone-fees 
relationship (hypothesis 2). Specifically, I test whether the tone-fees relationship is 
stronger or weaker in different litigation environments: cross-sectional in different 
industries, and cross-sectional pre and post-SOX sample periods. The test results are 
reported in Table 6. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Following Francis et al. (1994) and Ajinkya et al. (2005), I classify sample 
firms into high litigation industries and low litigation industries using the SIC code 
from COMPUSTAT. Table 6 reports the test results of the tone fee relationship across 
high litigation pressure industries and low litigation exposure industries. The 
coefficient of the indicator of high litigation industries is positive and significant (p = 
0.00). This result is in line with the results found by Seetharaman, Gul and Lynne 
(2002), which suggest that auditors charge a fee premium for firms facing higher 
litigation risk. The coefficient of the interaction term of a high litigation industry and 
the abnormal tone is negative and significant (p=0.01). This evidence is consistent 
with the prior evidence that managers are more conservative in disclosure when they 
are exposed to high litigation pressure. Since this result suggests that signal effect is 
stronger (or client risk effect is weaker) under the greater litigation pressure, my 
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hypothesis H2, the tone fees relationship doesn’t change across industries, is rejected 
by the Table 6 result. 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Prior literature (e.g. Wang 2010) also suggests that publicly traded companies 
face greater litigation pressure in the post-SOX period as compared to the pre-SOX 
period. Table 7 reports my test results of the tone fee relationship across the pre-SOX 
period and the post-SOX period. The coefficient of the SOX indicator is positive and 
significant (p=0.00). This finding is consistent with the results found by Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz (2009), which suggest that auditors charge a fee premium due to the 
additional audit effort required in post-SOX period. The coefficient of the interaction 
term of the post-SOX indictor and the abnormal tone is not significant (p=0.38). This 
result suggests that the tone fee relationship did not change from the pre-SOX period 
to the post-SOX period. Therefore, the hypothesis H2 is not rejected by Table 7 
evidence.  
<Insert Table 8 here> 
Lastly, I examine whether earnings informativeness could strengthen the 
association between audit fees and disclosure tone. Table 7 reports the results of the 
earnings informativeness moderating effect on the tone fee relationship. The 
coefficient on the low earnings informativeness indicator is positive and significant 
(p=0.02). This evidence is in line with the results found by Su, Siridihi and Gul 
(2007), which suggest that auditors charge a fee premium for to low earnings 
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informativeness firms. The interaction term of low earnings informativeness and an 
abnormal disclosure tone is negative, however not significant (p=0.64). Therefore, 
hypothesis H3a is not supported by the results in this table, and H3b is not tested since 
the signal effect dominates in my sample. The interaction term is not significant could 
be due to the fact that disclosure tone is changing from year to year, however my 
proxy of earnings informativeness is based on a rolling window of the prior 16 fiscal 
quarters. It is a limitation that my earnings informativeness proxy is calculated based 
on such a longer horizon, which could average out the change of informativeness 
from year to year. I got similar results using ERC calculated based on a 12 fiscal 
quarters rolling window. An earnings informativeness on the firm-year level could be 
better proxy for this hypothesis test. 
 
4.3 Additional Tests 
There are a number of alternative explanations for my results. Firstly, auditors 
may lower audit fees because of competition from other auditors when their clients 
disclose in a favorable tone. Since industry specialists have a competitive advantage 
compared to non-expert auditors, the tone fee relationship should be stronger in the 
non-expert auditors’ subsample compared to the audit experts’ subsample.27 I did not 
find any tone fee relationship difference between these two subsample (results are not 
reported). These results imply that tone fee relationship is not competition driven.  
                                                            
27 The audit experts, or industry specialists, are known to invest heavily in sophisticated auditing 
technologies and accrue a significant amount of experience in using such technologies in practice. 
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Secondly, Huang et al. (2014) provides evidence that investors are deceived 
by the abnormal tone in a press releases disclosure tone sample. Are auditors also 
deceived by the MD&A disclosure tone by giving fee discount? Assuming that 
auditors understand the behavior of their clients’ to a deeper degree over time, then 
fee discounts should be smaller as auditor tenure length increases. I did not find any 
difference in tone fee relationship across the subsamples defined by auditor tenure 
length longer than or less than three years (results are not reported). To some extent, 
these results preclude the possibility that the tone fee relationship is a phenomenon 
that only exists during the early stages of auditor-client engagement or the later stage 
of audit-client engagements. The results stay similar (not reported) if I delete the 
auditor tenure equals 1 year observations.  
Previous literature also suggests that there is a nonlinear relationship between 
audit fees and client size (Baber et al. 1987, Rubin 1987). To control for such 
nonlinearity, we repeat my regression analysis including the (LOGAT)2 term,28 and 
the results stay similar to reported results. Further regression analysis in both 
subsamples divided by the mean or median of the natural log of total assets also yield 
similar results.  
Lastly, my results are robust when performance matched discretionary 
accruals (Kothari et al. 2005), or when the absolute values of the discretionary 
accruals are included as additional control variables in the regression. This suggests 
that the tone fee relationship is stable after controlled for the potential earnings 
                                                            
28 Both LOGAT and square of LOGAT2 are positive significant (p<0.00) in the audit fees regressions.  
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management activities of managers. The results stay similar as the reported after I 
control the corporate governance by the independent board member ratio in the 
regressions. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Simunic’s (1980) analytical model suggests that rational auditors should 
incorporate any information related to engagement risk into their pricing decisions. 
Using the risk factors derived from reported financial numbers, prior audit pricing 
literature finds consistent evidence for this theory (e.g. Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; 
Crashwell et al 1995; Abbot 2003; Reynolds et al. 2004; Antle et al. 2006; Chang et al. 
2010; Defond and Zhang 2012). Extending this line of research, this work examines 
whether the qualitative information content in the MD&A sections of annual reports, 
such as disclosure tone, has any impact on audit pricing after controlling for the 
traditional client risk factors derived from numerical financial results.   
Unlike other disclosure channels, MD&A sections are required by the SEC to 
include forward-looking qualitative information about known trends, demands, events, 
commitments, plans and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to materially affect 
liquidity, capital resources or operations (SEC 1989, SEC 2003). I conjecture that the 
qualitative disclosure information could be useful for auditors for their pricing 
decisions because they could be indicators of both lower client business risk and 
higher litigation risk.  
The disclosure tone of MD&A sections are quantified with a Perl program by 
counting the frequency of positive and negative words based on dictionaries 
developed by prior literature (Stone et al. 1966; Hart 2000; Henry 2008; Loughran 
and McDonald 2011). I empirically explore whether and how the disclosure tone 
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impacts the pricing decisions of auditors by regressing the natural log of audit fees on 
common fee determinants and the disclosure tone scores as the experimental variable.  
I find that the coefficients of optimistic disclosure tone scores are negatively 
significant in my multivariate audit fee models. This empirical evidence implies that 
qualitative information has an impact on the audit pricing decisions, and that auditors 
generally view an optimistic disclosure tone as a signal of lower client business risk. 
Further analysis shows that the association between tone and audit fees is stronger in 
high litigation environment. 
 This work expands on knowledge established by prior literature at least in the 
following two ways. Prior literature provides evidence that auditors use risk related 
public numerical information, and private information in audit pricing decisions (Pratt 
and Stice 1994; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Stanley 2011; Picconi and Reynolds 
2013; Hackenbrack et al. 2013). By linking disclosure tone literature and audit pricing 
literature, this work contributes to audit fee information content literature with the 
evidence that qualitative information play an important role in audit pricing decisions. 
Moreover, this work also contributes to research on the economic 
consequences of qualitative disclosure properties. A growing literature studies how 
investors and financial analysts’ react to disclosure tone. Kothari et al. (2009) find 
that favorable tone disclosure is associated with a number of desirable economic 
consequences, such as the decreased cost of capital, lower stock return volatility, and 
higher analyst forecast accuracy. A number of other studies (Feldman et al. 2008; Li 
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2010; Loughran and McDonald 2011; Davis et al. 2012) find that the optimistic tone 
is correlated with positive stock price responses to disclosure events. In summary, this 
literature supports the idea that an optimistic tone is a lower firm risk. This paper 
extends this literature by providing evidence that an optimistic disclosure tone is an 
indicator of lower audit risk, which correlates with lower audit fees. 
 Lastly, a number of limitations and some future work are discussed here. First, 
the sample period is limited to 2000 to 2006 by the audit fee data and the MD&A data 
(from the Noah’s ark website). This sample period limits me from studying the tone 
fee relationship for the post financial crisis period. It could be beneficial to extract the 
MD&A sections from the recent annual reports and expand the sample period range in 
the future. Second, this paper focuses on the MD&A sections of annual reports, 
because managers are required by the SEC to disclose forward-looking information. It 
is worth noting that some other modes of disclosure, such as, press releases, and 
earnings conference calls, may also include voluntarily disclosed forward-looking 
information. Such an information set could also be used by auditors to evaluate 
engagement risks and therefore impact pricing as well as the disclosure tone 
information from MD&A in 10-K reports. By focusing on information sets from 
modes of disclosure other than the MD&A disclosure tone, future studies could find 
additional evidence of tone fee relationship. Thirdly, this paper focuses on the 
disclosure tone of MD&A sections, which becomes public information after the filling 
events of annual reports. Future research could investigate the private qualitative 
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information shared between managers and auditors. How such information impacts 
audit pricing could be a new contribution to audit fee information content literature. 
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Figure 1  
Timeline of Setting Audit Fees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The two circles in the first quarter of fiscal year t represent the following two events. 
One represents that the audit fee contract (i.e. engagement letter), is signed by the proper 
parties and becomes effective. Another one represents that the release of the prior year’s 
earnings or the annual report filling event. The engagement letter and the release of earnings 
are typically approved by the same board meeting (Hackenbrack et al. 2005; Hackenbrack et 
al. 2013). The purpose of having two separate circles is to show two ongoing events in the 
first quarter, and is not intended to show that one is happening early than the other event. 
  
Fiscal Year t 
Q4, t-1 Q1, t Q2, t Q3, t Q4, t 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
   
Dependent 
Variables 
   
AUDFEE = Audit fees in thousands of dollars. Calculated by the variable AUDIT_FEES 
from Audit Analytics divided by 1000; 
LAUDIT =  Natural log of audit fees in thousands of dollars. Calculated by natural log of 
AUDFEE; 
   
Experimental 
Variables 
    
TONE_LM =  
Disclosure tone of MD&A sections measured by the LM dictionary (Loughran 
and McDonald 2011); 
TONE_EH =  
Disclosure tone of MD&A sections measured by the EH dictionary (Henry 
2006, 2008); 
TONE_GI =  
Disclosure tone of MD&A sections measured by Harvard General Index 
dictionary(Stone et al. 1966); 
TONE_DI =  
Disclosure tone of MD&A sections measured by the dictionary extracted from 
the Diction software(Hart 2000); 
TONE =  
Principle component of LM, EH, GI, DI tone. Calculated by the SAS principle 
component analysis procedure; 
ABTONE =  Abnormal Tone, or the part of the disclosure tone subject to a manager's discretion; 
NTONE =  Normal tone, or the part of the disclosure tone commensurate with firm 
performance; 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions - Continued 
   
Control 
Variables 
  
ASSET = 
 
Total assets in millions of dollars; 
 
LOGAT = Natural log of total assets; 
BM = Book-to-market ratio; 
BUSY = 1 if the fiscal year end is December, and 0 otherwise; 
ROA = Income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; 
QUICK = Current assets divided by current liabilities; 
LEVERAGE = Total debts deflated by total assets; 
LOSS = 1 if the firm reports a loss for the current year, and 0 otherwise; 
INV_REC = Sum of inventories and receivables, divided by total assets; 
SPITEM = 1 if the firm reports a special item, and 0 otherwise; 
BIGN = 1 if the firm is audited by a big5 audit firm, and 0 otherwise; 
NSEG = The number of business segments; 
FOPS = 1 if the firm has a foreign operation, and 0 otherwise; 
GCM = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
REPORT_LAG = Time in days from fiscal year end to the audit report date; 
EXPERT = 1 if an auditor is both a national and city level expert, 0 otherwise; 
TENURE = Number of years for a client to be served by a specific auditor; 
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SOX = 1 if the fiscal year is larger than 2003, and 0 other wise; 
LITIGATION = 1 for high litigation industry firms (SIC codes between 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674,5200-5961 and 7370), and 0 otherwise; 
LOW_INFO = 
1 for low earnings informativeness firms, 0 otherwise, see Appendix III 
for details; 
SOX_ABTONE = Interaction between ABTONE and SOX; 
LITI_ABTONE = Interaction between ABTONE and LITIGATION; 
LOWINFO_ABTONE = Interaction between ABTONE and LOW_INFO; 
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Table 2 
 
Panel A: Sample Construction Procedure 
 
Noah’s Ark MD&A firm year observations (2000-2006)  24,173
    
Less 
Missing Compustat information (9,013)
     
Missing CRSP information (2,754)
     
Missing I/B/E/S information (3,950)
     
Missing Audit Analytics information (1,748)
     
Disclosure Tone and Audit Fees Sample 6,708 
 
The MD&A sections of annual reports were downloaded from Noah Smith’s website (i.e. Noah’s ARK) at 
Carnegie Mellon University. After deleting regulated industries observations (SIC code 40-49), and financial 
industries observations (SIC code 60-69), I have 24,173 firm year observations. More observations were removed 
from the sample if they were missing historical financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock return information from 
CRSP, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, or audit related data from Audit Analytics. The MD&A data from 
Noah’s ARK and the Audit fee data from Audit Analytics limit my sample period to 2000 to 2006. Perl Programs 
with specific dictionaries are used to count the positive, the negative, and the total words of each MD&A section 
to decide the tone scores for each MD&A section. The final tone fee sample has 6,708 firm year observations. 
  
64 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Panel B: Sample Year and Industry Distribution 
 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Total 
2000 38 57 22 11 150 49 91 66 484 
2001 57 67 23 9 248 86 118 85 693 
2002 54 72 27 12 301 98 127 82 773 
2003 78 132 44 25 392 113 202 104 1,090 
2004 94 145 51 36 408 155 214 120 1,223 
2005 99 143 51 37 393 151 210 130 1,214 
2006 102 145 62 39 370 170 213 130 1,231 
Total  622 761 280 169 2,262 822 1,175 717 6,708 
 
 
Industries are classified following Fama-French 12 industry portfolios: (1) Consumer Goods, including both 
durable and non-durable consumer goods industries; (2) Manufacturing, including machinery, trucks, planes, 
office furniture, paper production, and printing industries; (3) Energy, including oil, gas, and coal extraction 
and allied production industries (4) Chemical and allied product industries; (5) Business equipment, including 
computer, software and electronic industries; (6) Wholesale, retail, laundries and repair shops and related 
industries; (7) Heath care, medical instrument and drugs; (8) Other industries, including mines, construction, 
building management, transportation, hotels, entertainment. Detailed portfolios definition are available from 
Kenneth French’s websites. 29 There are no industry and year clustering in the sample.   
                                                            
29 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
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Table 3: Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N = 6,708) 
Variable Name  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  
25th 
percentile  
75th 
percentile 
AUDFEE  1,270.91  615.00  2,345.30  268.00  1,363.50 
LAUDIT  6.44  6.42  1.14  5.59  7.21 
TONE_LM  -0.27  -0.30  0.22  -0.43  -0.14 
TONE_EH  0.31  0.31  0.21  0.18  0.46 
TONE_GI  0.23  0.23  0.12  0.15  0.31 
TONE_DI  0.18  0.18  0.22  0.04  0.32 
TONE  0.05  0.03  0.99  -0.64  0.71 
NTONE  0.05  0.08  0.47  -0.24  0.39 
ABTONE  0.00  -0.03  0.85  -0.60  0.55 
ASSETS  1,469.88  368.05  3,510.88  122.16  1103.29 
LOGAT  5.96  5.91  1.59  4.81  7.01 
BM  0.52  0.41  0.52  0.25  0.65 
BUSY  0.68  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00 
ROA  -0.05  0.03  0.25  -0.06  0.08 
QUICK  2.82  1.86  2.87  1.13  3.35 
LEVERAGE  0.41  0.40  0.22  0.23  0.56 
LOSS  0.35  0.00  0.48  0.00  1.00 
INV_REC  0.28  0.25  0.20  0.12  0.39 
SPITEM  0.68  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00 
BIGN  0.93  1.00  0.26  1.00  1.00 
NSEG  2.13  1.00  1.53  1.00  3.00 
FOPS  0.59  1.00  0.49  0.00  1.00 
GCM  0.02  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.00 
REPORT_LAG  105.36  101.00  43.57  87.00  115.00 
TENURE  8.97  7.00  6.63  5.00  12.00 
EXPERT  0.28  0.00  0.45  0.00  1.00 
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Panel B: Correlation among Variables of Interest – Pearson (below)/ Spearman (above) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) LAUDIT 1 -0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 -0.05 0.72 -0.07 -0.04 0.26 
(2) TONE_LM -0.11 1 0.45 0.37 0.40 0.76 0.37 0.67 0.03 -0.10 0.03 0.14 
(3) TONE_EH 0.04 0.46 1 0.31 0.38 0.74 0.48 0.53 0.19 -0.12 0.02 0.22 
(4) TONE_GI -0.03 0.37 0.32 1 0.33 0.66 0.24 0.55 0.03 -0.13 0.01 0.02 
(5) TONE_DI 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.33 1 0.70 0.31 0.60 0.23 -0.07 0.01 0.20 
(6) TONE 0.03 0.77 0.74 0.68 0.72 1 0.48 0.73 0.13 -0.14 0.03 0.19 
(7) NTONE 0.16 0.37 0.51 0.37 0.38 0.48 1 0.01 0.26 -0.18 0.00 0.45 
(8) ABTONE -0.04 0.69 0.55 0.57 0.62 0.76 0.01 1 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 
(9) LOGAT 0.78 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.24 0.16 0.27 0.00 1 -0.01 -0.07 0.36 
(10) BM -0.19 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 -0.19 0.01 -0.06 1 -0.09 -0.22 
(11) BUSY -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 1 -0.08 
(12) ROA 0.26 0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.05 0.39 -0.01 -0.09 1 
(13) QUICK -0.25 0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.17 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.17 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 
(14) LEVERAGE 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.27 -0.08 0.06 -0.01 
(15) LOSS -0.26 -0.11 -0.17 -0.02 -0.20 -0.17 -0.23 0.01 -0.36 0.13 0.07 -0.62 
(16) INV_REC 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.32 
(17) SPITEM 0.30 -0.11 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.23 0.04 0.00 -0.05 
(18) NSEG 0.35 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.18 
(19) FOPS 0.44 -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 0.44 -0.06 -0.06 0.26 
(20) GCM -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.18 0.01 0.02 -0.31 
(21) REPORT_LAG -0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.03 0.00 -0.12 
(22) BIGN 0.13 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.18 -0.08 0.06 0.00 
(23) EXPERT 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.19 -0.02 0.00 0.07 
(24) TENURE 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.28 -0.04 -0.08 0.12 
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Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
(1) LAUDIT -0.28 0.28 -0.26 0.11 0.27 0.31 0.49 -0.09 -0.17 0.26 0.19 0.21 
(2) TONE_LM -0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 
(3) TONE_EH -0.12 0.05 -0.18 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.01 
(4) TONE_GI -0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
(5) TONE_DI -0.27 0.19 -0.20 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 
(6) TONE -0.17 0.11 -0.18 0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 
(7) NTONE -0.16 0.05 -0.22 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.09 
(8) ABTONE -0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 
(9) LOGAT -0.33 0.27 -0.39 0.00 0.27 0.32 0.44 -0.17 -0.28 0.32 0.19 0.26 
(10) BM -0.10 -0.09 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
(11) BUSY 0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 
(12) ROA -0.11 -0.03 -0.14 0.32 -0.12 0.14 0.23 -0.18 -0.19 0.01 0.07 0.12 
(13) QUICK 1 -0.70 0.15 -0.33 -0.10 -0.24 -0.09 -0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.09 -0.05 
(14) LEVERAGE -0.50 1 -0.05 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.09 0.03 
(15) LOSS 0.19 0.00 1 -0.32 0.10 -0.17 -0.23 0.18 0.17 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 
(16) INV_REC -0.34 0.20 -0.28 1 -0.04 0.19 0.18 -0.07 -0.04 -0.14 0.03 0.06 
(17) SPITEM -0.13 0.16 0.10 -0.08 1 0.14 0.21 0.02 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.04 
(18) NSEG -0.22 0.23 -0.17 0.10 0.14 1 0.23 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.06 0.09 
(19) FOPS -0.18 0.11 -0.23 0.13 0.21 0.25 1 -0.11 -0.11 0.16 -0.00 0.12 
(20) GCM -0.06 0.07 0.18 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.11 1 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
(21) REPORT_LAG 0.02 -0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 1 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 
(22) BIGN 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.15 0.11 0.05 0.16 -0.02 -0.06 1 0.17 0.22 
(23) EXPERT -0.06 0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.22 1 0.09 
(24) TENURE -0.06 0.09 -0.14 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.15 -0.04 -0.10 0.27 0.11 1 
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Table 3 
Panel C: Sample Univariate Analysis 
  
 
ABTone_Small Sample  
(3,354 obs) 
 
 
 
ABTone_Large Sample 
(3,354 obs) 
 
 T-test Wilconox 
  Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  Mean Median 
LAUDIT  6.53 6.54 1.14  6.39 6.35 1.17  0.14*** 0.19*** 
TONE  -0.64 -0.57 0.72  0.72 0.69 0.73  -1.36*** -1.26*** 
ABTONE  -0.68 -0.58 0.52  0.67 0.55 0.53  -1.35*** -1.13*** 
NTONE  0.04 0.10 0.49  0.04 0.10 0.51  0.00 0.00 
LOGAT  6.03 5.95 1.64  5.99 5.92 1.66  -0.04 0.03 
BM  0.52 0.43 0.50  0.52 0.39 0.63  0.00 0.04*** 
BUSY  0.66 1.00 0.47  0.69 1.00 0.46  -0.03*** 0.00*** 
ROA  -0.05 0.03 0.33  -0.07 0.03 0.37  0.02** 0.00 
QUICK  2.86 1.93 2.82  2.70 1.65 3.20  0.16* 0.28*** 
LEVERAGE  0.41 0.38 0.23  0.44 0.42 0.22  -0.03*** -0.04*** 
LOSS  0.34 0.00 0.47  0.35 0.00 0.48  0.01 0.00 
INV_REC  0.28 0.24 0.20  0.28 0.25 0.21  0.00 -0.01 
SPITEM  0.70 1.00 0.46  0.66 1.00 0.48  0.04*** 0.00*** 
NSEG  2.18 1.00 1.57  2.16 1.00 1.55  0.02 0.00 
FOPS  0.62 1.00 0.49  0.54 1.00 0.50  0.08*** 0.00*** 
BIGN  0.93 1.00 0.26  0.93 1.00 0.25  0.00 0.00 
GCM  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00** 
REPORT_LAG  105.66 101.00 44.72  106.05 101.00 47.24  0.39 0.00 
TENURE  9.01 7.00 6.68  9.16 7.00 6.83  0.14 0.00 
EXPERT  0.28 0.00 0.45  0.30 0.00 0.46  -0.02** 0.00** 
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Table 4  
 
Testing the Association between Audit Fees and Disclosure Tone 
(Raw Disclosure Tone Scores) 
 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
       
INTERCEPT ? 1.95*** 2.02*** 2.04*** 1.99*** 1.98*** 
       
TONE_LM ? -0.32***     
TONE_EH ?  -0.15***    
TONE_GI ?   -0.28***   
TONE_DI ?    -0.08**  
TONE ?     -0.06*** 
       
LOGAT +  0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 
BM - -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
BUSY +  0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
ROA - -0.39*** -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.32*** 
QUICK - -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
LEVERAGE +  0.20*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
LOSS + 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
INV_REC + 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
SPITEM + 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
NSEG + 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
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FOPS + 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
BIGN + 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
GCM + 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
REPORT_LAG + 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
TENURE + 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
EXPERT + 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
       
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
      N  6,708 6,708 6,708 6,708 6,708 
       
Adjusted R2  0.812 0.810 0.809 0.809 0.811 
       
       
 
The multivariate regression results reported in table 4 are based on the following model: 
 
LAUDITt = α0 + β0DISCLOSURE_TONEt-1 + β1LOGATt + β2BMt + β3BUSYt+ β4ROAt 
 + β5QUICKt + β6LEVERAGEt + β7LOSSt + β8INVRECt 
 + β9SPITEMt + β10NSEGt+ β11FOPSt+ β12BIGNt 
 + β13GCMt + β14REPORT_LAGt+ β15TENUREt+β16EXPERTt+ εjt. 
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Where the dependent variable (LAUDIT) is the natural log of fees (in 000s) paid to auditors for audit services. DISCLOSURE_TONE is the 
disclosure tone metric, the experimental variable, including prior year TONE_EH, TONE_LM, TONE_GI, TONE_DI and TONE calculated as 
described in section 3.2. For the definition of the control variables, please refer to Table 1. *,**,*** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Following Krishnan et al. (2013), the standard errors are clustered by firm identifiers (gvkey). Similar results 
are found if standard errors are clustered with both firm identifiers and fiscal year (Petersen 2009 and Gow et al 2010). 
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Table 5 
 
Testing the Association between Audit Fees and Disclosure Tone 
(Abnormal Tone: H1a and H1b) 
 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
INTERCEPT ? 2.02*** 2.04*** 3.29*** 
     
ABTONE ?  -0.03*** -0.04*** 
     
NTONE ? -0.18***  -0.19*** 
LOGAT + 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
BM - -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
BUSY + 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
ROA - -0.31*** -0.33*** -0.30*** 
QUICK - -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
LEVERAGE + 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
LOSS + 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 
INV_REC + 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 
SPITEM + 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
NSEG + 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
FOPS + 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 
BIGN + 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 
GCM + 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 
REPORT_LAG + 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
TENURE + 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
EXPERT + 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
     
Industry 
Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
     
N  6,708 6,708 6,708 
Adjusted R2  0.811 0.810 0.813 
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The multivariate regression results reported in table 5 are based on the following model: 
 
LAUDITt = α0 + β0DISCLOSURE_TONEt-1 + β1LOGATt + β2BMt + β3BUSYt+ β4ROAt 
 + β5QUICKt + β6LEVERAGEt + β7LOSSt + β8INVRECt 
 + β9SPITEMt + β10NSEGt+ β11FOPSt+ β12BIGNt 
 + β13GCMt + β14REPORT_LAGt+ β15TENUREt+β16EXPERTt+ εjt. 
 
Where the dependent variable (LAUDIT) is the natural log of fees (in 000s) paid to auditors for 
audit services. DISCLOSURE_TONE is my disclosure tone metric, the experimental variable, 
including prior year NTONE and ABTONE calculated as described in section 3.2. For other 
control variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. *,**,*** represent significance levels of 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Following Krishnan et al. (2013), standard errors 
are clustered by the firm identifiers (gvkey). Similar results are found if standard errors are 
clustered with both firm identifiers and fiscal year (Petersen 2009 and Gow et al. 2010). 
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Table 6 
Panel A: Testing the Association between Audit Fees and Disclosure Tone 
(High Litigation Industries: H2) 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient P-Value 
    
INTERCEPT ? 3.48 0.00 
    
LITIGATION ? 0.06 0.00 
ABTONE ? -0.03 0.00 
LITI_ABTONE ? -0.01 0.05 
    
NTONE ? -0.24 0.00 
LOGAT + 0.43 0.00 
BM - -0.06 0.00 
BUSY + 0.10 0.00 
ROA - -0.17 0.00 
QUICK - -0.03 0.00 
LEVERAGE + 0.12 0.00 
LOSS + 0.07 0.03 
INV_REC + 0.25 0.00 
SPITEM + 0.14 0.00 
NSEG + 0.05 0.00 
FOPS + 0.33 0.00 
BIGN + 0.25 0.00 
GCM + 0.12 0.01 
REPORT_LAG + 0.00 0.00 
TENURE + 0.01 0.01 
EXPERT + 0.07 0.00 
    
Industry 
Dummies  No 
Year 
Dummies  Yes 
N  6,708 
    
Adjusted R2  0.805 
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The regression results reported in table 6 are based on the following model: 
 
LAUDITt = α0 + β0ABTONEt-1 + β1LITIGATION t-1 + β2ABTONE t-1*LITIGATION t-1 
 + β3LOGATt + β4BMt + β5BUSYt+ β6ROAt 
 + β7QUICKt + β8LEVERAGEt + β9LOSSt + β10INVRECt 
 + β11SPITEMt + β12NSEGt+ β13FOPSt+ β14BIGNt 
 + β15GCMt + β16REPORT_LAGt+ β17TENUREt+β18EXPERTt+ εjt. 
Where the dependent variable (LAUDIT) is the natural log of fees (in 000s) paid to auditors for 
audit services. Litigation is the indicator variable for high litigation industries (following Ajinkya 
et al. 2005). For other control variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. *,**,*** represent 
significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Following Krishnan et al. 
(2013), standard errors are clustered by firm identifiers (gvkey). Similar results are found if 
standard errors are clustered with both firm identifiers and fiscal year (Petersen 2009 and Gow et 
al. 2010). 
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Table 7 
Panel B: Testing the Association between Audit Fees and Disclosure Tone 
(Sarbanes Oxley Act: H2) 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient P-Value 
    
INTERCEPT ? 2.55 0.00 
    
SOX ? 0.78 0.00 
ABTONE ? -0.05 0.00 
SOX_ABTONE ? -0.01 0.24 
    
NTONE ? -0.20 0.00 
LOGAT + 0.45 0.00 
BM - -0.04 0.01 
BUSY + 0.11 0.00 
ROA - -0.15 0.00 
QUICK - -0.04 0.00 
LEVERAGE + 0.20 0.00 
LOSS + 0.06 0.00 
INV_REC + 0.26 0.00 
SPITEM + 0.15 0.00 
NSEG + 0.05 0.00 
FOPS + 0.27 0.00 
BIGN + 0.24 0.00 
GCM + 0.14 0.01 
REPORT_LAG + 0.00 0.00 
TENURE + 0.00 0.03 
EXPERT + 0.08 0.00 
    
Industry 
Dummies  Yes 
Year 
Dummies  No 
N  5,935 
Adjusted R2  0.773 
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The regression results reported in table 7 are based on the following model: 
 
LAUDITt = α0 + β0ABTONEt-1 + β1SOX t-1 + β2ABTONE t-1*SOX t-1 
 + β3LOGATt + β4BMt + β5BUSYt+ β6ROAt 
 + β7QUICKt + β8LEVERAGEt + β9LOSSt + β10INVRECt 
 + β11SPITEMt + β12NSEGt+ β13FOPSt+ β14BIGNt 
 + β15GCMt + β16REPORT_LAGt+ β17TENUREt+β18EXPERTt+ εjt. 
Where the dependent variable (LAUDIT) is the natural log of fees (in 000s) paid to auditors for 
audit services. SOX is the indicator variable for the post SOX sample period. For other control 
variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. *,**,*** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Following Krishnan et al. (2013), standard errors are 
clustered by firm identifiers (gvkey). Similar results are found if standard errors are clustered 
with both firm identifiers and fiscal year (Petersen 2009 and Gow et al. 2010). I removed 2002 
observations from the sample for this test. 
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Table 8 
Panel A: Testing the Association between Audit Fees and Disclosure Tone 
(Low Earnings informativeness: H3a and H3b) 
 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient P-Value 
    
INTERCEPT ? 3.36 0.00 
    
LOWINFO ? 0.03 0.02 
ABTONE ? -0.03 0.01 
LOWINFO_ABTONE ? -0.02 0.64 
    
NTONE ? -0.19 0.00 
LOGAT + 0.45 0.00 
BM - -0.05 0.01 
BUSY + 0.10 0.00 
ROA - -0.17 0.00 
QUICK - -0.04 0.00 
LEVERAGE + 0.18 0.00 
LOSS + 0.06 0.00 
INV_REC + 0.26 0.00 
SPITEM + 0.11 0.00 
NSEG + 0.05 0.00 
FOPS + 0.26 0.00 
BIGN + 0.23 0.00 
GCM + 0.12 0.03 
REPORT_LAG + 0.00 0.00 
TENURE + 0.00 0.02 
EXPERT + 0.07 0.00 
    
Industry 
Dummies  Yes 
Year 
Dummies  Yes 
N  6,587 
Adjusted R2  0.813 
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The regression results reported in table 8 is based on the following model: 
 
LAUDITt = α0 + β0ABTONEt-1 + β1LOWINFO t-1 + β2ABTONE t-1*LOWINFO t-1 
 + β3NTONEt + β4LOGATt + β5BMt + β6BUSYt+ β7ROAt 
 + β8QUICKt + β9LEVERAGEt + β10LOSSt + β11INVRECt 
 + β12SPITEMt + β13NSEGt+ β14FOPSt+ β15BIGNt 
 + β16GCMt + β17REPORT_LAGt+ β18TENUREt+β19EXPERTt+ εjt. 
 
Where the dependent variable (LAUDIT) is the natural log of fees (in 000s) paid to auditors for 
audit services. LOWINFO is the indicator variable which equals to 1 if a company’s earnings 
informativeness is less than the median of the sample, and equals to 0 otherwise. Please see 
appendix III for the details of earnings informativeness calculation. For other variables definition, 
please refer to Table 1. *,**,*** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent, respectively. Following Krishnan et al. (2013), the standard errors are clustered by the 
firm identifiers (gvkey). Similar results are found if standard errors are clustered on both firm 
identifiers and fiscal year (Petersen 2009 and Gow et al. 2010). 
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Appendix I 
 
 
The following is a sample of forward looking statements excerpted from the 
management discussion and analysis part of the Intel Corporation’s annual report filed on 
2/14/2013 for the fiscal year that ended on 12/31/2012.  
… 
As we look into 2013, we expect revenue to grow in the low single digits with 
particular strength in our server market segment. We believe the renewed innovation in 
the PC industry that we fostered with Ultrabook systems and expanded to other thin and 
light form factors, will blur the lines between tablets and notebooks and provide growth 
opportunities in 2013. We also expect to launch new SoCs for smartphones and tablets, 
based on our 22nm process technology. In 2013, we expect an increase in capital 
expenditures primarily driven by beginning construction of a 450mm development 
facility as we progress toward manufacturing with 450 mm wafer technology later in the 
decade. 
… 
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Appendix II 
 
Decomposing the Tone 
 
Following Huang et al. (2014), I decompose TONE into the normal component 
NTONE and the abnormal component ABTONE. The normal component is the part of the 
tone that could be explained by firm fundamental information, growth opportunities, 
operating risk, and complexity, which are all available to the general public at the time of 
10k disclosure. The abnormal component is the part of the tone that is under the firm 
mangers’ discretion, which is not explained by the firm fundamentals and the business 
environment. Specifically, TONE is decomposed by the following regression on the 
annual cross-sectional level. The NTONE is the predicted value, and the ABTONE is the 
residual from the following regression. 
TONEjt = α0 + β0EARNINGSjt + β1RETURNSjt + β2SIZEjt + β3BTMjt + β4STDRETjt + 
β5STDEARNjt + β6AGEjt + β7BUSSEGjt + β8GEOSEGjt + β9LOSSjt + β10ΔEARNjt + 
β11AFEjt + β12AFjt + ∑Industry Dummies + εjt 
The dependent variable is the principle component of raw tone scores (TONE) as defined 
in Table 1. The independent variables are defined the same as Huang et al. (2014): 
EARNINGS = earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. 
EARNINGS is a variable to control for firm profitability; 
RETURNS = contemporaneous annual stock returns. RETURNS is a variable to control 
for market expectation of future firm cash flow value; 
82 
 
 
 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the fiscal year end. Using 
alternative natural logarithm of total assets yield similar results as reported; 
BTM = book to market ratio measured at the fiscal year end. BTM is a variable to control 
for firm growth opportunity; 
STDRET = the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the window of the last 
fiscal year, with at least eight months of data required; 
STDEARN = the standard deviation of EARNINGS calculated over the window of the last 
five years, with at least three years of data required. STDRET and STDEARN are controls 
for the firm operating and business risk; 
AGE = natural logarithm of one plus the number of years from the first year the firm 
entered COMPUSTAT, AGE controls for the firm’s life cycle stages; 
BUSSEG = natural logarithm of one plus number of business segments, or 1 if this 
variable has missing value from COMPUSTAT; 
GEOSEG = natural logarithm of one plus number of geographic segments, or 1 if this 
variable has missing value from COMPUSTAT, BUSSEG and GEOSEG are controls for 
firm operating complexity; 
LOSS = 1 if EARNINGS is negative, or 0 otherwise; 
ΔEARN = change of earnings before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets; 
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AFE = analyst forecast error, defined as I/B/E/S earnings per share minus the median of 
the most recent analyst forecast, deflated by the stock price per share at the end of the 
fiscal year. LOSS, ΔEARN and AFE are used in this regression as earnings bench marks; 
AF = analyst consensus forecast for the following year earnings per share, scaled by stock 
price per share at the end of the fiscal year. AF is a variable to control for managerial 
assessment about the firm’s future performance; 
 Using the following year’s return on assets to replace the analyst forecast (AF) for 
the following year also yield similar results as reported. Alternatively, my results are 
similar to reported results if I run the decomposing regression at the industry and year 
level.  
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Appendix III 
 
Earnings Informativeness Calculation 
 Following Bird and Ruchti (2014), I calculate a measurement of earnings 
informativeness on the firm level. Specifically, I run the following regression on a 16 
quarter rolling window for each firm year. 
 Returnt= α + β1EPSt + β2ΔEPSt, t-1 + ε 
 The independent variable, Return, is the total stock return from the next day of 
prior quarter earnings announcement day to the next day of current quarter earnings 
announcement day. The dependent variables, EPSt is the earnings per share deflated by 
the beginning stock price of current quarter, and ΔEPSt, t-1 is the change of earning per 
share. The earnings informativeness here is defined as how much stock returns are 
explained by the earnings and earnings change. Therefore, I sue the R-Square of the 
above regression as the measure of earnings informativeness. Another possible measure 
of earnings informativeness is the sum of β1 and β2 for each firm, similar results as 
reported are obtained if I use this alternative proxy. 
  The reason why I didn’t regress the abnormal return on the earnings surprises here 
is because the analyst forecast errors are typically used as proxies for earnings surprises 
in such regressions, and the forecast errors are known under the influence of the 
disclosure tone (Kothari et al. 2009). Therefore, it is not clear that the earnings response 
coefficients calculated this way will be a better proxy of the informativeness of the 
reported earnings numbers only.  
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